The government of common agricultural and forestry land is a topic that is currently enjoying a revival of interest. Many local communities have shown the ability to pursue sustainable use of natural resources thanks to their self-governed authorities. In this context the relationship between public and private interest which is established in use of the resource is a fairly controversial. The paper proposes a dynamic model to analyse the behaviour of a user of a common property resource in a "real option" framework, where the value of the right to use the resource is affected by: 1) uncertainty on the future amount of the resource; 2) entry and exit costs and 3) the number of users competitors.
Introduction
The collective use of natural resources, …rst and foremost agricultural and forestry land, has been an important factor in the social and economic evolution of many rural communities. Local historiography is, in fact, dotted with episodes directly or indirectly linked to the exercise of collective rights over private land or the government of common property land. The mixture of public and private rights in the use of land has very ancient origins (Forni, 1972; Sereni, 1955) and is probably linked to the practical impossibility of enforcing property rights over all the bene…ts produced by the land and/or the expediency of tailoring the procedures for use of the speci…c bene…t to its characteristics (economies of scale, organisation of work, aversion to risk) 1 . From their origins to the present day, collective uses have undergone considerable changes, all directed to a progressive reduction of their role, in favour of substantial privatisation (Merlo, 1995) . There are various reasons for this trend: a) the establishment of central national authority over the local power of the communities; b) the pressure exerted by the great landed property over public lands 2 ; c) the expediency of removing impediments preventing rational cultivation of the land (Acerbo, 1924) 3 . The historical vicissitudes of common property can be interpreted also by analysing the relationship between evolution of the productivity of the land and the level of social and economic development:
² where productivity was subject to rapid appropriable improvements, in general a gradual privatisation of common property has occurred, as for example in the common property lands of the northern plain of Italy;
² where productivity is modest (forestry land, marginal grazing land) and social and economic development is good, common property has been maintained and is undergoing transformation into institutions with mainly social and environmental objectives: Communities of the Eastern Alps;
² where productivity is modest and social and economic development is behind, common property has been maintained for mainly economic purposes but it has not produced strong enough institutions to cope with the change of roles which it will sooner or later be called upon to undertake: common lands of the marginal areas.
In some rural areas, therefore, where the tradition of local government was more …rmly rooted (alpine areas) or where the di¢culties of private economic exploitation were greater (marginal grazing lands), forms of collective land use have survived. The reasons for this phenomenon are many and di¢cult to classify as various environmental, economic and political factors are involved, the analysis of which goes beyond the scope of the paper.
These situations, however, appear to be united by the need to reorganise action according to new environmental objectives. Analysis of the relationship which these communities have succeeded in establishing with the natural resources governed therefore constitutes an element of considerable topical interest. In fact, contrarily to the forecasts of the theoretical models on the use of common property goods (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1999) there are signi…-cant examples of how some of them have succeeded in establishing a balanced relationship with the surrounding environment, to the extent that use of the resources can be de…ned as "sustainable" 4 . Analysis of the success of these institutions in the government of common natural resources cannot disregard the relationship between private use and public interest. In fact, pursuit of the objectives of the communities in government of the resources requires the adhesion of the subjects involved. Often the social bene…ts produced by common government are linked to productive use of the resources by private individuals. In this case private use is combined with a positive external factor 5 : public bene…t. This study proposes a model which, with reference to a "typical" holder of a collective resource use right, permits assessment of the expediency of using or not using it according to his current state (user or non-user). As the decision shares the characteristics of the majority of investment decisions, i.e. it is a choice which always has a certain irreversible component, it is taken in the presence of uncertainty as to the extent of the future bene…ts and it is a decision that can, to a certain degree, be postponed, it is reasonable to assume that the best choice must satisfy slightly more restrictive conditions on expected utility than those suggested by the usual present net value. Uncertainty in the availability 4 The de…nition of sustainability in the use of resources and in development is highly controversial (Howarth, 1997) . However, if we assume as reasonable the de…nition given by the Brundtland commission "sustainable development is development that satis…es the needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future " (WCED, 1987) and the analytical consequences in terms of "non-decreasing utility" in the long term (Pearce and Turner, 1990 ), development of the relationship between local communities and natural resources that has been established in many of these institutions can undoubtedly be de…ned as"sustainable". On the role of collective properties in the government of natural resources, see also Franceschetti (1999) . 5 The de…nition of externality is fairly elusive. In this context, an enlightening de…nition is the one proposed by Baumol and Oates (1988, p.17-18) who subordinate the presence of externalities to two conditions "1) . . . . . whenever some individual's (say A's) utility or production relationship include real (that is non monetary) variables, whose values are chosen by others (persons, corporations, governments) without particular attention to the e¤ects on A's welfare; 2) The decision maker, whose activity a¤ects others' utility levels or enters their production functions, does not receive (pay) in compensation for this activity an amount equal in value to the resulting bene…ts (or costs) to others". of natural resources implies that there can be future conditions that may vary present expediency. The irreversibility of certain costs, both entry and exit, means that, if the user opts for a certain decision, he will not be able to recover the related cost. Finally, the expediency of waiting to decide enables him to acquire more information and therefore reduce the probability of regretting the choice made. Having said this, the choice the user (actual or potential) has to make can be compared to a "real option" or a right, but not obligation, to make or divest himself at any time of an investment at pre-set conditions and, therefore, the uncertainty as to the future bene…ts brings out a value linked to the expediency of postponing the choice 6 . The model was used to test the entry and exit conditions in use of the resource in the presence of certain factors such as uncertainty and investment/disinvestment costs. The study of these conditions holds a certain interest as the e¤ectiveness of the management and the economic and social e¢ciency of these institutions is closely linked to collective participation in use of the shared resource. Excessive use or, more often, abandonment can lead to profound modi…cations in the institutional set-up and the ability to pursue the set purposes.
Common property goods or pure public goods?
Before illustrating the model that represents the behaviour of the user of the common property resource it is useful to correctly focus on the use of the common resource from the economic point of view in order to clearly de…ne the boundary conditions. From this point of view the reference to the theory of public goods which usually classi…es economic goods according to rivalry and excludability in consumption is immediate (see table 1) 7 . Table 1 -A general classi…cation of economic goods 6 In other words the user, actual or potential, clearly perceives the bene…ts deriving from the possibility of postponing the decision (value of the option) in the absence of reliable information on the future evolution of the usable resource (Freeman, 1984) and in the presence of non-reversible costs (Conrad, 1999) . A recent manual by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provides a thorough survey of this approach applied to various economic questions. 7 The classi…cation does not take account of the legal status (public or private) of the owner and is based exclusively on the way in which the goods are used. There is rivalry in consumption when the use of goods by an individual is not compatible with that of other subjects. The same amount of goods cannot be used by several subjects and the increase in users necessarily involves an increase in the availability of the goods. On the contrary, "nonrival" goods and services are characterised by the fact that their utilisation by an individual is compatible with consumption by one or more individuals. An increase in the number of users does not necessarily determine an increase in the quantity of the goods utilised. On the other hand, excludability in consumption exists when it is possible for the holder of certain goods to exclude, and therefore select, the users from the bene…ts produced by the goods. This depends on the concrete possibility of asserting property rights over the goods produced or owned (Brosio, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1994 Examination of the table shows that common resources fall into the category of common-pool resources. This classi…cation, however, is not of great use in identifying the reasons for the success recorded by some communities in conserving common resources: there are considerably more complex questions than those that can be described via the above pattern.
It could be useful to study excludability in further detail. The latter, in fact, could be assessed with respect to two distinct points of view: the user and the quantities used (see table 2). It is obvious that if the excludability is realisable for each speci…c unit of resource, it is implicitly realisable also for the user: this is the case of private goods. On the contrary if it is di¢cult to monitor the quantities used and the users, we have the case of the so-called "commons" and the predictable "tragedies" well described by Hardin (1968) .
Finally, there are cases in which it is possible to perform an e¤ective control on the users whereas control of the quantities actually used is much more uncertain. This is the case of property in small communities where the persons with the right to use of the resource are easy to identify but it is much more di¢cult to know the amount of resource actually collected due to the laboriousness of the related controls and uncertainty as to the amount of resource available at the time of collection 8 . The uncertainty on the quantities used by each person with the right to use of the resource could be mitigated by knowledge of the technology available or admitted for use of the common resource. The condition for the constitution of institutions for the government of common resources therefore appears to be the possibility of exercising su¢cient exclusion from use of those who do not have the right to said use. In fact, it would be pointless for a community to create rules for the use of a resource if external subjects can access it undisturbed.
The possibility of circumscribing the community of users is not su¢cient, however, to explain the success of some communities in the management of environmental resources. Various authors have underlined that the reasons for this should be …rst of all sought in ethical and cultural factors and, de…nitively, in the value attributed by individuals to membership of communities with wellestablished traditions. The considerable di¢culties in reconstructing common government of resources where it has been abandoned in the past (Edwards, 1998; Merlo, 1995) support this theory 9 . The question was dealt with in depth by Elinor Ostrom (1996 Ostrom ( , 1999 by studying communities that boast a consolidated tradition in the government of common resources. The reason underlying the success of the communities examined appears to lie in the ability to adopt appropriate rules for use of the common resource and in observance of the same. This ability can, at least partially, be traced back to the characteristics of the resource and the users.
The focus now moves from examination of the system characteristics to analysis of individual user behaviour. The analysis was performed presupposing that there is a certain co-operation (see also CF4, CI3, CI4) between the users and respect for the common rules. Under this assumption, modelling of the interactions between the competitors normally achieved by means of the classic tool of non-cooperative games (Ostrom et al., 1994 ; p. 51-73) takes second place with respect to analysis of the expediency of the individual user and the main factors conditioning the bene…t 10 . Generally speaking, the expediency of using a common resource is assessed by pondering the costs and ben…ts deriving from use. Furthermore, since the assessment can be made at any time, it is not su¢cient for the current bene…ts to exceed current expenses; it is also necessary for the net bene…t to be greater than the net bene…t obtainable by exercising the right of use at any future time. The latter requirement is very important when using resources of biological origin, the utility ‡ow of which varies due to natural causes such as seasonal or annual variations or due to anthropic causes such as environmental renewal and draw-o¤ by other activities.
Let's consider a potential user of a resource who assesses, at a given time, the expediency of using it and who has to submit to the following boundary conditions, which summarise and integrate those illustrated in the previous paragraph.
1. the right cannot be bought or sold but is acquired with the occurrence of particular conditions (residence, inheritance, etc.);
2. the holder of the right is free to use it or not and renunciation of use of the right does not involve any compensation;
3. the decision to exercise the right always generates a non-recoverable outlay (irreversible investments);
4. the decision to cease exercise of the right of use can generate non-recoverable exit costs;
5. the decision to exercise the right, interrupt or resume use can be taken at any time;
6. the decision to exercise the right involves the production of a negative external factor a¤ecting the other actual users and due to the resource subtracted by the user;
7. the user respects the rules established by the community for use of the resource.
Assuming the previous boundary conditions, construction of the model presupposes the de…nition of a bene…t function. The latter depends, given that the market prices and technology available or permitted are known, on the quantity of resource that is expected to be obtained. Therefore, the instantaneous net bene…t expected by the user of the resource is given by the following function B(x t ; n t ); with B x > 0 and B xx · 0, where x t is the stock of resource at time t and n t indicates the number of rival users drawing on the same stock at the same time. The number of potential rival users can vary between 0 and n (maximum number of persons with the right to use the resource). n can be considered constant for the rest of the analysis, since the number of persons with the right to use of the resource changes very slowly 11 . The number of rival users is inserted in the bene…t function as it is assumed that the instantaneous quantity of resource available for each user is negatively correlated with their number due to a competition e¤ect 12 . Therefore, an increase in real rivals produces a reduction in bene…t, i.e. B n < 0:
The amount of the resource considered is measured by a variable x t which, it is assumed, satis…es the following stochastic di¤erential equation 13 :
In the equation (1)°(x t ) represents the expected natural growth rate of the stock and is decreasing with respect to the amount of the stock itself x t 14 ; h(x t ; n t )n t is the expected individual collection rate multiplied by the number of users present at time t and represents the reduction of the stock produced by use on the part of the competitors. This reduction is generally positively linked to the consistency of the stocks. The expected individual collection rate is positively correlated with the consistency of the stock and negatively with the number of rival users 15 . The model also incorporates the possibility of some chance factors, such as meteorological and climatic trends, a¤ecting the stock and the growth rate of the biomass. The term ¾x t is the measure of the variability and dW t is the di¤erential of a Brownian motion with mean E(dW t ) = 0 and variance 11 In fact, years of residence are usually necessary to be admitted to use of the common resource. 12 It should be noted that the problem faced by a single user who shares the resource with others di¤ers from the one of the policy-maker who considers the aggregate bene…t of all the users. In this context the user, if rational, will include an assessment of the stock in his bene…t function and this assessment will vary inversely with the number of rivals present (Arnason, 1990) . 13 For an introduction to di¤erential stochastic equations and Brownian motions, see Cox and Miller (1965) , and Harrison (1985) . 14 The models most widely used to optimise the use of renewable resources incorporate processes of autolimitation of the growth rate as the stock grows (Clark, 1990) . 15 This assumption is in line with the classic approach to modelling of the use of renewable resources where the e¤ort spent in collection (E), understood as the aggregate of capital, energy and work employed in a certain interval of time (Schaefer, 1954) necessary for the collection of a certain quantity (h) of resource, is inversely proportional to the consistency of the stock (x).
E[(dW t )
2 ] = dt 16 . A simple reduced form for ¹(x t ; n t ) could be identi…ed by the following expression: ¹(x t ; n t ) = ¹(n t )x t , with ¹ 0 (n t ) · 0 to take account of the fact that an increase in competitors reduces the growth rate of the stock of resource available 17 . In this way, x t becomes a geometric Brownian motion:
which allows us to obtain a closed solution for the value of the right to use of the resource.
The value of the right to use of the collective resource
The right of use consists in the faculty to draw on a certain common resource for a certain period, in the places prescribed and according to established procedures. In other words it can be considered as an asset that provides an instantaneous bene…t B(x t ; n t ) which depends on the level assumed by the stock of resource and the number of users. We assume, without losing out in generality, that n t is constant and equal to the maximum number of users n: We also assume for B a functional form of the type:
It is now possible to identify the amount of the net bene…t produced by the common resource at time t: This bene…t will be di¤erent depending on whether the holder of the right is exercising it or not. For an individual who is actively using the resource, the net bene…t is expressed, at time t; by the function:
The …xed costs we consider here are, as standard in the literature, ‡ow …xed costs of production: that is, we assume that the user begins the …rst period 16 The speci…cation of the variability adopted in the (1) could be enriched, without in any way altering the results obtainable, with the representation of sudden variations in the stock of resource caused by exceptional external events such as pollution, …re, poaching etc. In this case the (1) becomes:
where dQ t is the variation of a Poisson process, independent of W t ; with mean arrival timȩ : The process dQt then has the following probability distribution:
with probability 1 ¡¸dt
In this regard see Moretto and Rosato (2000) . 17 See Moretto and Rosato (2000) as to abtain this form of the growth rate of the stock.
endowed with an unit of capital the operation of which entalils a ‡ow cost c per unit of time. If, on the contrary, the holder of the right does not exercise it, we will have ¼(x t ; n) = 0. Yet, the holder of the right sustains a sunk cost k > 0 whenever s/he wishes to make this right operative 18 and an exit cost equal to l¸0 if s/he renounces use of the resource 19 . Since, from (2), the actual user is aware that the stock of resource available can increase and diminish with a positive probability, it is evident that s/he can continue using the resource even in particularly adverse conditions in the hope of avoiding the exit cost l and/or any re-entry cost k . In the same way, the potential user will decide to activate the process of utilisation of the resource only if the expected bene…t is considerably higher than the entry cost k, in order to take account of the possibility of it worsening following a negative ‡uctuation of x t .
As highlighted by Dixit (1989) and Moretto (1996) , the decision to keep or exercise the two options available to the user must be taken with respect to two thresholds x L and x H , with x L < x H , in the resource stock x t . An actual user will …nd it expedient to continue in his/her activity as long as the stock of resource remains above the minimum level de…ned by x L , but will suspend use as soon as x t drops below x L . On the contrary, an individual who has to decide whether to exercise his/her right will activate utilisation only if the stock rises above the threshold x H : As long as x t does not exceed this threshold, his/her optimal strategy will be to wait, without exercising the option (right) of use the resource.
Assuming that there is homogeneity among users and that each one decides whether to activate or not utilisation of the resource in order to maximise his/her discounted value of future expected net bene…ts, it is possible evaluate the right to use of the common resource in the two possible situations:
² actual use; ² potential use.
De…ning W 1 (x) as the value of the right to use of the collective resource by an individual who is actually using the resource, we get:
18 It should be noted that if the holder of the right decides to resume use of the resource s/he will have a new outlay equal to k; as it is inherent in the assumptions (Dixit, 1989) . 19 As pointed out by Tirole (1988, p.307), …xed costs are indipendent of the scale of production and are locked in (sunk) for the short lenght of time that de…nes the production period. For natural resources extraction, c may reperesent the amonut of money spent by the user to reach the resources site, while k could be referred to the capital, not fully reconvertible, necessary for the use of the resource. The expense l, on the other hand, could be referred to restoration of the initial conditions of the resource.
where ½ is the discount rate and W 0 (x L ) represents the value of the right to use the resource by an individual who is not actively using it. This "potential" value is calculated at time T L = inf(t¸0 j x t < x L ) when the user will refrain from exercising his/her right, and x L is the threshold that has induced him/her to refrain from use. If, on the other hand, an individual is in the position of being a potential user, his/her optimal strategy will be to implement utilisation only if the stock of resource reaches the threshold level x H : Since s/he receives no bene…t from the resource while s/he is waiting, we get:
where T H = inf(t¸0 j x t¸xH ) indicates the moment, and x H the threshold, at which it will become expedient to activate the utilisation process.
The user's optimal strategy
The model described in the previous paragraph enables us to identify the optimal strategy of the user, actual or potential, with regard to the common resource. This strategy takes the form of the choice between the options described in table 3. The optimal strategy is identi…ed by solving a dynamic programming problem. >From equations (5) and (6) the solution for W 1 and W 0 must satisfy the following conditions (Dixit, 1989; Moretto 1996) :
¡W 0 (x) = 0; for x 2 (0;
where ¡ indicates the di¤erential operator:
The operating constraints are:
The four equations (9)- (12) indicate the usual conditions of value matching and smooth pasting for identi…cation of the optimal strategy. The value matchings (9) and (10) require the indi¤erence of the user at the time of switching from the status of actual user to that of potential user and vice versa. The smooth pastings determine optimality for the threshold values x L and x H :
Together with the equations (9)- (12), the solution of the di¤erential equations (7) and (8) requires certain boundary conditions:
where the term
½ indicates the present value of the future expected bene…ts which the actual user expects to obtain from inde…nite use of the resource (Harrison 1985 , p. 44). To guarantee the positivity of this term we need to assume ½ ¡1 > 0:
From the linearity of the di¤erential equations (7) and (8) and using (13) , it is possible to show that the value of the right to use the collective resource for an actual user is given by:
and for a potential user:
with ¡® < 0 and¯> 1: Having indicated with
½ the present value of the future expected bene…ts, the additional terms A 1 x ¡® and A 0 x +¯i ndicate the value of the option to suspend or activate use of the resource, respectively. It therefore follows that the constants A 0 and A 1 must be positive. These constants, together with the thresholds x L and x H ; are obtained by solving the system (9)- (12) . Due to the non-linearity of the system (9)- (12), it is not possible to obtain a closed solution for x L and x H . However, it is possible to obtain some properties of x L and x H . The characteristics of the entry thresholds of the potential user and exit thresholds of the actual user can be deduced from the following proposition where the interval is de…ned within which to …nd the optimal threshold values (see Appendix).
Proposition: If c > ½l; the threshold for abandonment of use of the resource satis…es the inequality:
The threshold for activation of use of the resource satis…es the following inequality:
The proposition highlights two bounds, lower and upper, within which to identify the optimal thresholds. A …rst analysis shows that these limit values are simply the Marshall long-run average costs (c ¡ ½l) and (c + ½k) multiplied by a factor, ® 1+® ½¡1 ½ < 1 and¡ 1 ½¡1 ½ > 1 respectively, which accounts for the irreversibility of the decision to abandon or activate the use of the resource.
In this regard, the classic microeconomic approach clearly shows that the potential user should activate use of the resource if the bene…t exceeds the long-run average cost, where by long-run average cost we mean the cost c plus the annual interest (annuity) on the investment ½k: In the same way, an active user should consider the expediency of abandoning use of the resource if the bene…t drops below the average costs c. However, if there is an explicit cost of abandoning the activity l; the user should take account of the interest s/he would save by postponing the exit, i.e. c ¡ ½l:
Furthermore, the proposition maintains that if the user has to take a decision under uncertainty and such a decision involves non-recoverable costs both at entry and exit, the static Marshall thresholds are no longer valid. The optimal values can be "considerably" di¤erent: for activation, the potential user waits for the bene…t to rise well above the long-run average cost before starting to use the resource, and before abandoning it the actual user waits for the bene…t to drop well below the average exit cost.
Obviously if c · ½l, the trigger value x L is placed equal to zero and the option to abandon loses value, which is equivalent to placing A 1 = 0 in (14) . Therefore:
Corollary: If c · ½l, the threshold for abandoning use of the resource is equal to x L = 0; while the threshold for activation becomes:
Some comparative statics
The results obtained in the proposition can be used to assess the e¤ect of changes in the boundary conditions of use of the resource. By the dynamic structure of the model, the simulations were performed essentially for investigating the trend of the entry and exit threshold values. Analysis of the thresholds permits evaluation of the e¤ect of a certain action on the direction and stability of evolution of use of the common property resource. The following table shows the possible states in use of the resource that can be obtained by comparing the amount of the resource with respect to the thresholds (x L ; x H ) and with respect to the extent of the di¤erence between the same, which can be de…ned as the hysteresis range (¢ HL = x H ¡ x L ). This di¤erence can be considered a proxy of the stability of the system: the greater the interval ¢ HL the greater the ‡uctuations in the availability of the resource that do not a¤ect the decisions of the user. Examining the results of comparative statics, the e¤ect of the following factors was taken into consideration:
1. the non-recoverable cost of entry (k) and exit (l); 2. the ‡ow …xed cost (c);
the uncertainty (¾);
4. the number of rivals (n).
The simulations of the entry cost (k) highlighted that as it increases, the level of hysteresis (¢ HL ) increases. In other words, the threshold values diverge as the entry cost increases
The formal demonstration of this result can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chap.7) . In any case, this result is also intuitively justi…ed: the potential user postpones implementation of his decision as the cost increases and, therefore, x H increases. Moreover, this trend can also be derived from the classic microeconomic approach. It is also interesting to note that as k increases, x L diminishes and, therefore, the tendency to abandon use of the resource once activated. In fact, as the amount of the resource available is uncertain, there is the possibility that use of the same will become once again expedient in the future. In this case, continuing use, the user can avoid running into the increasing non-recoverable expense k: As the cost k increases, the value of the option to abandon increases and therefore the expediency of retaining it increases. The increase in the entry cost k always results in a stabilisation of the current situation: in fact the threshold values that make it expedient to exercise any option (entry or exit) become more remote.
This result allows us to throw light on the e¤ect of possible incentives to the entry of users of common resources. The incentive that involves a reduction in the non-recoverable entry costs causes the thresholds to converge and therefore makes the system more ‡exible, both at entry and exit.
Similar results are obtained by increasing the exit cost (l). In fact, the threshold values diverge as the exit cost grows
The explanation, both formal and intuitive, is similar to the previous one: if the exit cost increases, the expediency of continuing use will be strengthened, postponing the recovery costs. Likewise, for the potential user, an increase in the exit cost is a disincentive to activating use of the resource as it means an increase in outlay to be sustained if the resource contracts in the future, making use of it no longer expedient.
The model enabled us to highlight that the existence of non-recoverable costs, both entry and exit, generates the divergence between the entry and exit thresholds. Obviously, if these costs are not present, the decision is perfectly ‡exible and the threshold values in the bene…t converge at the operating cost h
In this case, the threshold value, unique, increases as the ‡ow …xed cost increases
A resource for which the …xed costs associated with operation increase will be more di¢cult to use and will be abandoned more easily.
The analysis performed so far could have been carried out using traditional economic analysis tools. The model permits a more detailed study of the e¤ect of the uncertainty, however. In this regard it is possible to demonstrate that an increase in the uncertainty relating to the dimension of the future stock of the resource (¾) always entails an increase in the hysteresis (¢ HL ) i.e.:
In fact, it is easy to demonstrate that @@ ¾ < 0; therefore an increase in ¾ increases the multiplication coe¢cient¡ 1 . Likewise, it can be shown that @® @¾ > 0; so that an increase in ¾ reduces the multiplication coe¢cient
The overall e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty is to increase the di¤erence between the optimal threshold values x H and x L :
Uncertainty, therefore, ampli…es the e¤ect of the non-recoverable entry and exit costs and its modulation can constitute a lever in government of the common property resource. The quantity of information to be circulated and "programming" of the use, by reducing the uncertainty, can reduce the level of hysteresis and make the system more ‡exible at both entry and exit. It should not be forgotten, in fact, that the e¤ect of the uncertainty is to increase the degree of inertia of the user, anchoring him to his present state.
Lastly, the simulations have highlighted that the e¤ect of an increase in the number of users has di¤erent e¤ects according to certain boundary assumptions. For example, if the number of users does not alter the growth rate of the resource and therefore the productivity does not drop [¹ 0 (n) = 0] and there is a reduction in the bene…t that can be obtained by the individual user due to mutual disturbance [regardless of the rivalry, B 0 (n) < 0], an increase in the number of rivals involves an increase in both threshold values
. This e¤ect is due to the decreasing marginal bene…ts with respect to the number of users. Assuming the same conditions, therefore, an increase in the number of rivals produces a disincentive to exercise of the entry option in the presence of decreasing bene…ts. Likewise, for the actual user, the entry of new competitors can be an incentive to exercising the exit option.
If, on the other hand, the number of users does not alter the marginal bene…t [B 0 (n) = 0] ; but reduces the marginal productivity [¹ 0 (n) < 0], an increase in the number of rivals involves a reduction in the threshold values:
The e¤ect is due to the fact that the increase in n reduces the productivity (1); which causes¯to increase, therefore leading to a reduction in the multiplication coe¢cient¡ 1 . The opposite e¤ect occurs for the coe¢-cient ®: In short, if the user is aware that the increase in the number of users a¤ects the growth rate of the resource, and there are no signi…cant negative congestion e¤ects, he will be stimulated to activate use of the resource to avoid future competition over the decreasing resource.
Lastly, in the case in which the increase in competitors simultaneously produces a reduction in the future growth rate of the resource and a congestion e¤ect on the private bene…t [B 0 (n) < 0 and ¹ 0 (n) < 0], it is impossible to de…ne a priori the cumulative e¤ect on the entry and exit thresholds. It will depend on the relative amount of the reduction in the growth rate with respect to the congestion e¤ect.
Conclusions
The government of common property resources is a very topical subject and there is a certain interest in analysis of the institutions that have shown an ability in the past to manage natural resources in a "sustainable" manner. It is fairly di¢cult to explain the reasons for this success.
Analysis of the institutional and social aspects appears to be essential in order to explain the formation and development of these institutions over time. In the context of this analysis, study of the behaviour of the individual user is important; in fact, achievement of the social objectives of use of the common property resources also depends on his decisions. This study illustrates a model for representing the behaviour of a user of a common and reproducible natural resource. The model was developed from the assumption that the expediency of exercising a right to use is comparable to a real option since the uncertainty as regards future bene…ts and the irreversibility of certain expenses make it expedient to wait before activating or abandoning the use. This approach has involved the development of a model for determination of the value of the right to use and the rules that govern exercise of it. The model was used to verify the behaviour of the user as the boundary conditions varied.
Firstly, the simulations highlighted that the decision of the user to exercise the entry or exit option is taken with respect to two di¤erent thresholds and that said thresholds diverge due to the non-recoverable entry and exit costs and the uncertainty with regard to future availability of the resource. The di¤erence between thresholds, hysteresis, signi…cantly in ‡uences the ‡exibility of use of the resource: a high hysteresis produces an increase in inertia of the users who are anchored to their initial condition.
Attention has therefore shifted to factors a¤ecting the degree of hysteresis.
The amount of the non-recoverable entry and exit cost signi…cantly in ‡u-ences the di¤erence between the thresholds, which grows as said costs increase. This result allows us to assess the possibility of tailoring possible incentives to the entry of users of common resources. The incentive, by reducing the nonrecoverable entry costs, causes the thresholds to converge and makes the system more ‡exible, both at entry and exit. Similar e¤ects are produced by the exit incentive. If there are no non-recoverable entry and exit costs, the threshold value, unique, is determined by the …xed cost per unit of preriod, an increase in which always produces an increase in the threshold.
Uncertainty ampli…es the e¤ect of the non-recoverable costs and an increase in uncertainty always involves an increase in hysteresis. Control of uncertainty makes the system more ‡exible, both at entry and exit, reducing user inertia.
Lastly, the simulations highlighted that the increase in the number of users has fairly ambiguous e¤ects. If there is a considerable congestion e¤ect, additional to the rivalry in use of the resource, but the growth rate of the resource is not a¤ected, the increase in the number of users acts as a deterrent to use, encouraging exits and discouraging entries. If, on the contrary, the increase in the number of users negatively a¤ects the productivity of the resource, but there is no congestion e¤ect, the user is stimulated to use the resource immediately in order to avoid future competition. If a signi…cant congestion among users and reduction of the productive capacity of the resource occur simultaneously, it is not possible to identify a univocal e¤ect. The …nal result is linked to the relative extent of the impact of the increase in congestion and reduction in productivity of the resource on the bene…t of the user.
The proposition in the text can be proved by substituting equations (14) and (15) in (9)- (12) and obtaining the following system of four equations:
Since the above system is linear in A 0 and A 1 ; by substituting (16) in (17) we get:
The equation (20) indicates the value of the option that an actual user has to abandon use of the resource in the future, assessed at the exit threshold x L : For this value to be positive, it is su¢cient for the right-hand side of (20) to be positive, i.e. it must be:
Symmetrically, the equation (21) refers to the option value to become an active user, calculated at the exit threshold x L . Here again, for this value to be positive, the following is necessary:
Since¯> 1 and ® > 0 we have¡ 1 > 1 > ® 1+® > 0; and with ½ >1 , the inequalities (22) and (23) are both positive or both negative according to the sign of the term (c ¡ ½l). In this speci…c case:
if and only if c · ½l
if and only if c¸½l
Reasoning in the same way, it is possible to obtain an interval for the activation threshold x H , which is always positive and greater than x L : Considering the last two equations, (18) and (19) , and substituting (18) in (19) we get:
For the value of the option to be positive, it is su¢cient for the right-hand side to be positive, i.e.:
and:
Putting together the (22), (23), (26) and (27) 
